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Abstract—We propose embedding executable code fragments
in cryptographically protected capabilities to enable flexible dis-
cretionary access control in cloud-like computing infrastructures.
We are developing this as part of a sports analytics application
that runs on a federation of public and enterprise clouds. The
capability mechanism is implemented completely in user space.
Using a novel combination of X.509 certificates and Javscript
code, the capabilities support restricted delegation, confinement,
revocation, and rights amplification for secure abstraction.
I. INTRODUCTION
The predominant way of providing discretionary access
control in the cloud is through a combination of authentica-
tion and access control lists. But such mechanisms are not
without problems. People and even entire companies end up
with accounts in many different places. While single-signon
mechanisms exist, they are adopted sparingly. To deal with
their many accounts, people often use the same user name
and password everywhere, or variations on a password that
are easy to generate (e.g., “mypwd4amazon”), but also easy
to reverse engineer. A malicious administrator at one site can
then access accounts of users at other sites.
This problem with access control list became apparent while
developing Muithu [9], a sports analytics application that runs
on a federation of public and enterprise clouds. A wealth of
performance data is being collected in real-time by teams,
sports media, and spectators. Careful analysis of such data
is a crucial part of competitive sports. Much of the data is
private and highly sensitive; this includes medical performance
data, internal individual performance evaluations, and future
training strategies.
An important part of Muithu is abstraction. Raw data from
various sources are processed and made available in another
form, so that multiple layers of abstraction can be developed.
With access control lists, each layer would need to have
accounts with the lower layers, and also keep track of accounts
of its own users and manage who is allowed to access which
data. Much of the complexity then revolves around securely
managing user accounts and correctly configuring the access
control lists. Access control lists make it difficult to maintain
fine grained control over distribution and access of data.
The mechanism we propose here does not require au-
thenticating any users because authorization is done through
capabilities. Capabilities are unforgeable digital tokens that
can be passed around, and possession of a capability grants
specific rights to services independent of who the possessor
is. Consistent with the Principle of Least Privilege, capabilities
are given out on an as-needed basis. Capabilities have been
used in a variety of systems. The instantiation of capabilities
that we propose is novel in a variety of ways:
• the capabilities contain embedded code that allow fine-
grained control over restricted delegation. In other words,
the set of rights that can be delegated is not predefined
as in most capability-based systems but can be evolved
as needed;
• to support secure abstraction, the proposed capabilities
support rights amplification;
• no special trusted language, trusted operating system
kernel, or other trusted infrastructure is required—the
capabilities are managed completely in user space using
public key cryptographic techniques;
• even though managed in user space, transfer of capabil-
ities is implicitly mediated so that confinement can be
supported;
• a directory service provides a secure way for users
to manage their capabilities, and to delegate restricted
capabilities to other users.
We call these capabilities “code capabilities” or codecaps for
short.
II. SECURE ABSTRACTION
Notational Analytics has become a competitive advantage
for many elite sport coaches resulting in an emerging sport
analytics industry. Example data include physical variables of
individual athletes like speed, distance covered, agility, energy
consumption, and muscle force. Such objective physical data is
acquired using body-area sensors and from vision algorithms
parsing video feeds. Additional data is added by expert ana-
lysts like whether a soccer pass was successful or not and how
well a team is performing. Major team sports like baseball,
basketball, and soccer are avid users of such analytics systems.
In close collaboration with a Norwegian major-league soc-
cer club, we developed Muithu, a cloud-based notational
analytics system for recording and analyzing soccer team
performance data. A key requirement for Muithu was the
ability to externalize collected data to third parties that, for
instance, specialize in complex sports analytics. Also, a recent
trend is to publish performance data on social media and
more traditional broadcasting channels. A new generation
of sport viewers familiar with social networks and micro-
blogs tend to prefer this type of information while watching
sport events. For instance, during the last European soccer
championship in June 2012, major broadcasters distributed
real-time performance data on social media platforms and
traditional television broadcasts while games unfolded. This
included statistics about successful passes, number of corners,
attempted shots on goal, meters covered by individual players
and the like. Obviously, there are strong security constraints
related to athlete and team performance data. In particular,
medical related information like heart-rate and injuries are
highly personal and cannot be made public.
The architecture of Muithu is designed to simplify the devel-
opment of new sports analytics applications while observing
security requirements from the ground up. One can think
of Muithu as consisting of layers of abstraction. Each layer
implements its own services and supports operations through
a remote procedure call mechanism. Access to data is mediated
through codecaps. Services are run by principals; clients that
access services are principals as well.
The base-layer of Muithu consist of captured notational
data, video feeds, and sensor data that are pushed to and
stored on an enterprise cloud platform through a REST API.
This set of data, hosted by the base-layer principal P0, is
represented as a set of data objects that can be accessed
through a simple interface. Such data objects may, for instance,
correspond to raw sensor data of individual players in the
team, and might be updated as new data about that player
becomes available. Additional layers are then added as the data
is being processed and tagged. Some layers have significant
cloud resources available, but others work more like a library
executed by their clients, often using JavaScript in the browser.
The cloud resources of such layers are only accessed when the
library cannot handle requests itself.
As an example, consider the situation where a team coach
P1 wants to provide up-to-date information about each player
object o to the local supporter club P2. However, P1 has no
interest in running a large web site to share this information.
Instead, P1 can obtain a codecap c1 from P0 for o and give P2
a library and a delegated codecap c2 for o. When P2 invokes
the library, the library can use c2 to access the current version
of o directly from P0 and generate the derived object o′ using
the client’s computational resources. Code in c2 ensures that
P2 can only access those parts of o that P1 allows it to access.
Now suppose that there are certain proprietary operations
on o that P1 does not want to distribute in the library itself or
using parts of the data in o that P1 does not want P2 to access
directly. For instance, P1 might not want to give access to
detailed heart-rate information, but instead provide only access
to aggregated values. In that case the library can accesses a
service run by P1 to execute the operation using codecap c2,
as illustrated in Figure 1. P1 cannot use c2 directly to access
o because it does not have the corresponding private key and
because it does not give the necessary access rights. However,
as we shall see, P1 can reconstruct c1 from c2 and pair the
resulting code cap with its own private key to obtain the correct
access credentials to o. This is a case of rights amplification, a
necessary ingredient of secure abstraction. It is not necessary
for P1 to keep around all the intermediate codecaps, which
would be inconvenient and waste computing resources.
Fig. 1. Muithu data layering example
In general, abstraction often involves more than one object,
and consequently more than one codecap. When a client
requests an object, it obtains both a library for the object and
the collection of codecaps that the library needs to access the
underlying data for the objects. Only clients need to keep track
of codecaps, as rights amplification allows the lower layers to
reconstruct them as necessary. This much simplifies building
secure cloud services compared to one based on access control
lists in which user accounts must be managed and credentials
for lower layers must be stored.
III. CODE CAPABILITIES
The implementation of codecaps is based on standard cer-
tificate chains. Each principal P is identified by its public key
P.pubkey and has a corresponding private key P.privkey
that it keeps carefully hidden from other principals. In order
for a client to execute a request as some service, the client
needs a codecap for the request.
A codecap cn is a pair 〈hn, kn〉 consisting of a heritage
and a private key. The heritage hn is a chain of public key
certificates [C1 :: C2 :: ... :: Cn] corresponding to a chain of
n+1 principals P0...Pn. (The operator :: denotes list concate-
nation.) In this case, P0 has delegated certain rights to P1, P1,
has delegated rights to P2, ..., and Pn−1 has delegated rights
to Pn. Certificate Ci is signed by ki−1 = Pi−1.privkey. kn
is the private key of Pn. Codecap cn is owned by principal
Pn and gives access rights to services provided by principal
P0. However, P0 does not have access control lists, does not
need to know anything about Pn, and only needs to maintain
its private key k0.
Each certificate Ci is a collection of attributes signed by a
private key. An attribute is a pair consisting of a name and
a value. We denote by Ci.attr the value of the attribute
named “attr” in certificate Ci. Each certificate Ci has at least
the following attributes:
• Ci.pubkey: contains Pi.pubkey;
• Ci.rights: contains a boolean function that takes a
request as argument and returns true iff the function
allows the request.
Note that the validity of a heritage can be checked by anybody
who knows P0.pubkey, and that the private key kn in the
codecap is the private key corresponding to the last certificate
Cn on the heritage. A request is itself a certificate, signed by
kn = Pn.privkey. In some sense the request is appended to
the end of the heritage as a certificate Cn+1 as if delegated.
The attributes in the request describe the request type and its
various parameters. Principal P0 will execute the request only
if heritage hn is valid, the request’s signature can be verified,
and if Ci.rights(r) holds for all i in 1...n.
Principal P0 determines the programming language in which
the rights functions are expressed. The language can be very
simple. For example, a file service might have a language that
consists of only three programs: “R”, “W”, and “RW”. When
the program “R” is applied to an update operation, it evaluates
to false.
We intend the language to be Turing-complete and to
provide powerful library functions, such as JavaScript. For
example, say that a file service only provides “read” and
“write” operations and we want to create a codecap that can
“increment” an integer that is stored in the file. The client
would first read the file and then write back the incremented
value. The rights function in the codecap would check that
the value that is to be written is an integer that is one higher
than the integer stored in the file. Rights functions may also
be able to read the clock on the server. This can be used to
implement expiration times on codecaps, or, for example, to
specify that an operation is only allowed during daytime.
It is important that such rights functions cannot have ex-
ternal effects (such as writing files or sending messages) and
that the functions have finite running times. They must be
carefully sandboxed; loops and recursion may be disallowed
and running times may be limited by a timer.
IV. USING CODECAPS
To illustrate how codecaps are used, suppose a client Pn
has a codecap cn for a service provided by P0 and wants P0
to execute a request r. To do so, client Pn sends a message
m to P0 that contains the following attributes:
• m.request: a certificate that described the requested
operation and is signed by Pn.privkey;
• m.heritage: contains hn, the heritage of the codecap
needed to execute the request.
Upon receipt of a message m, P0 verifies the her-
itage, and verifies the signature on the request certificate
using Cn.pubkey. P0 then checks that all rights func-
tions Ci.rights(m.request) return true. For exam-
ple, a rights function might express m.request.type =
READ ∧ m.request.offset ≥ 256. If verified, P0 exe-
cutes m.request and returns the result to client Pn.
Note that an eavesdropper on the network may intercept
the request message and obtain the heritage of the codecap.
However, without the corresponding private key, the eaves-
dropper will not be able to sign new requests with it. The
eavesdropper can replay the request—it is thus important that
either the service is capable of eliminating duplicates or that
requests are idempotent. In practice, communication between
a client and a service is usually over SSL, eliminating this
concern.
There are two ways in which a codecap can be created.
The first is from scratch, when a new service is offered or
a new client is added. The second is by (possibly restricted)
delegation, in which case a client communicates one of its
codecaps to another principal. Note that only heritages of
codecaps are communicated between principals—the recipient
of the heritage of a new codecap has to complete the codecap
by pairing it with its private key.
We illustrate here how confinement can be achieved. A
principal Pn can create a codecap for Pn+1 so that Pn+1
cannot delegate rights of that codecap to other principals
without revealing its private key to those principals. The idea
is that the rights function in certificate Cn+1 has the ability
to test if it is the rights function of the last certificate in the
heritage of the codecap, returning false if not. If Pn+1 is
faulty it can share its private key with other principals, but this
does not extend the damage from having delegated to Pn+1
in the first place.
When confined, a principal Pn that wants to delegate to a
principal P ′
n
must ask one of the principals on the heritage
of the codecap to generate a codecap for P ′
n
. In the limit, a
service may choose to confine all its codecaps and thus be
involved whenever delegation takes place.
V. CODECAP DIRECTORIES
Clients and services may end up owning many codecaps. All
codecaps of a principal have the same private key, which the
principal has to maintain securely. To simplify management
of all the heritages and delegation, we are developing a
distributed directory service. Directories are objects that map
string names to codecaps. However, different from ordinary
directory services, a “lookup” operation is a restricted delega-
tion: the directory service delegates its rights to its client.
A directory has rows and columns. Both rows and columns
have names. There are no two rows with the same name, and
no two columns with the same name. The first column is called
“name” and contains the name of the row. The second column
is called “cap” and contains the heritage of a codecap in each
row. The remaining columns contain rights functions. Each
such column is called a group. Directories support an operation
“chmod” by which rights functions in the group columns may
be updated. The execution of the chmod operation itself is
restricted by rights expressed in the directory codecap.
A directory codecap gives access to one or more groups
within a directory. Given a directory codecap dc, the operation
lookup(dc, name, group) first finds the row for the given name.
In the row it retrieves a heritage hn in the “cap” column and
the rights function R in the given group. The directory service
then delegates its rights given by hn by appending a new
heritage hn+1 using R and signed by the private key of the
directory service. The directory service then returns the result
to the client, which uses hn+1 and its private key to construct
a codecap.
Since directories are objects themselves, they may be or-
ganized in any arbitrary directed graph structure (it does
not have to be a tree and can contain cycles). A user then
needs to hold only one codecap, that of its “home directory”.
Given the codecap of its home directory, all objects reachable
from that directory, subject to the restrictions specified in the
rights functions, are accessible to the user. Note that it is not
necessary that all directories are serviced by the same physical
server. In a large scale system there may be many directory
servers in different geographical locations.
We do not run public directory services, however, as this
would be tantamount to simulating access control lists using
codecaps. Directories are privately owned by principals and
run by those principals to keep track of their own codecaps
and to help with delegating codecaps to other users.
The directory service library supports path names of the
form “/a/b/c”. The library maintains two directories: that of
the home directory and that of the working directory. Path
names that start with “/” are evaluated relative to the home
directory while other path names are evaluated relative to the
working directory. Initially the home directory and the working
directory are the same. A library “chdir” method updates the
working directory.
VI. REVOCATION
The “chmod” operation (as well as the “remove” operation)
on directories provide a means to do selective revocation,
preventing users from obtaining codecaps. However, codecaps
that have already been distributed remain valid. Various ways
have been proposed to revoke outstanding capabilities. (For
an early approach, see [11].) One is to associate version
numbers with objects [7]. A codecap would be for a version
of the object, and certificate C1 would contain the version
number the codecap refers to. When a service wants to
invalidate outstanding codecaps on one of its objects, it simply
increments the version number of the object. (This technique
may also be used for key rotation or dealing with lost private
keys.)
This only works for the raw objects. If an intermediate
service wants to revoke delegated codecaps, it must ask the
provider of the raw object to increment the version number.
Selective revocation can be supported with this scheme by
having multiple version numbers per object, that is, one
version number for each group of principals. Alternatively,
services can build expiration times into the rights functions
of codecaps as described above. Clients should think of such
codecaps as “soft references” that may at any time become
invalid. Those clients should be prepared to acquire new
codecaps when necessary.
Another revocation technique exploits indirection. An inter-
mediate service, instead of passing out delegated codecaps,
could generate fresh codecaps and act as a proxy to the
service that provides the raw objects. Such a scheme also
supports selective revocation in which only a subset of clients
are affected. This proxy scheme complicates the intermediate
service (in a similar way as maintaining access control lists)
and consequently has security disadvantages compared to the
simple scheme of revoking all outstanding codecaps. Whether
to use one scheme or another can be determined by each
application individually.
A weakness of codecaps compared to access control lists
is that there is no way to review which principals have rights
to a service [6]. One option is for a service to confine all
its codecaps so it is involved in and can keep track of all
delegation.
VII. OBJECT LIFETIMES
So far we have only considered operations on objects (and
services) that already exist. We now turn to how objects are
created at a service run by some principal P0, and how such
objects can be garbage collected when there are no more
outstanding references (codecaps) to those objects. A client
typically needs a codecap with factory rights in order to create
new objects. For example, a directory server may distribute
codecaps with factory rights that can be used to create new
directories. For convenience, codecaps for factory objects may
be available in special “yellow pages” directories that are
referenced by well-known codecaps.
When principal P0 receives a “create” request from a
principal P1, it checks to make sure that P1 has factory
rights. If so, P0 creates a new object and a corresponding new
heritage h1 containing a certificate C1 that specifies the rights
that P1 gets on the object. Service P0 then sends heritage h1
to P1, which adds its private key in order to obtain a codecap
c1 for the object.
The dual of creation is garbage collection, a difficult prob-
lem in distributed object systems as it is hard to identify
which objects are no longer reachable. We present a partial
solution here. The idea is that every object has a “primary
link” consisting of a directory codecap and a name. If there
is a codecap for the object stored in the corresponding row of
the directory, then the object persists. If not, then the object
is eventually destroyed. (An object may optionally support
multiple primary links.)
To implement this, the service that provides the object
periodically checks the object’s primary link to see if it still
points to the object. If so (or if directory is unavailable),
then the object persists. Otherwise, the object service destroys
the object. If a directory service is discontinued, then there
may be a set of objects that have dangling primary links.
Those primary links are stored in “lost+found” directories.
These directories are checked and cleaned up manually by
an administrator.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION
Our prototype implementation of codecap authorization is
based on standard X.509 certificates [3] using the widely
adopted OpenSSL1 library and tools. The X.509 standard
defines several standard fields in certificates including a subject
name, an issuer name, and validity dates. It enables us to
1http://www.openssl.org
make use of RSA, DSA, and ECC, with varying key sizes
and parameters. We use established best practices. Certificates
can be either self-signed, in which case a PKI is not required,
or signed by a common trusted CA.
A codecap heritage is implemented as list of concate-
nated X.509 proxy certificates as defined in the RFC-3820
standard [13]. This standard defines the proxyCertInfo cer-
tificate extension containing three fields: path length, pol-
icy language, and policy. The path length C.pLength is
used to restrict the length a heritage and can be used to
implement confinement. The policy field holds our rights
functions C.rights (expressed in JavaScript), and the policy
language C.pLanguage is set to anyLanguage to indicate
application-specific policies.
Certificate size varies with key size, signature algorithm,
and with the size of the information used to identify subject
and issuer. A certificate may also contain extensions with
variable content length. A typical PEM encoded certificate
combining 2048-bit RSA public key with SHA-1 and with
common extensions like subject key identifier, authority key
identifier, and usage constraints, will be about 1.2 KB. In the
more compact DER binary representation, the same certificate
is 0.86 KB.
Currently we do all communication over SSL, since it
is widely adopted on the Internet for server authentication
using X.509 certificates. By requiring that the optional client
authentication step of the SSL handshake is run, both end-
points will mutually authenticate themselves to each other. The
protocol also provides us with transport level encryption.
After establishing the mutually authenticated SSL connec-
tion and having received the server certificate Cs, the client
can check that it is connected to the right service. The client
is free to reject certificates that do not conform to additional
constraints like a valid expiration date or set usage areas. If
the client accepts the connection, it will transmit the heritage
in combination with its intended request.
Although SSL supports transmission of more than one
certificate from the server to the clients during the handshake,
its intended use is to inform the client about trusted CAs, and
there is no facility for transferring extra certificates from the
client to the server. Therefore, a codecap containing multiple
certificates cannot be transferred and validated during the SSL
handshake and codecaps must be validated separately.
Having received the client certificate Cc, the heritage hn,
and the request r, the server will check that:
• Cn.public = Cc.public (to ensure that the client is
correctly authenticated);
• for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, Ci.subject = Ci+1.issuer (to
ensure that the heritage is correctly chained);
• for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, Ci.pLength > Ci+1.pLength ≥
0 (sanity check);
• the signature of each certificate verifies with the issuer’s
public key.
var allow = heritage[idx].get_subject().CN;
if (request.uri == allow) 1; else 0;
Fig. 2. A simple JavaScript based rights function
We have enhanced the Twisted-Python2 web-server module
with codecap-based authorization. To transfer the heritage, we
extended the commonly used HTTP authentication mechanism
with a codecap credential method. The client authenticates
itself by setting the header field:
Authentication: Codecaps <heritage>
where <heritage> is the list of PEM encoded X.509
certificates. If the header is not provided or the heritage does
not validate correctly the server returns a “401 Unauthorized”
error code and includes the header:
WWW-Authenticate: Codecaps realm=<sub>
where <sub> corresponds to P0.subject and is used by
the client to identify the correct codecap to use. If the same
codecap is used to authorize multiple requests, the server may
temporarily store the provided heritage and use a client-side
session cookie to decrease network overhead.
To evaluate the rights function we use the Firefox Spi-
derMonkey3 JavaScript engine. When executed, the script is
initialized with the following context:
• heritage — a list of X.509 certificate objects;
• idx — the position in the heritage list of the certificate
currently being evaluated; and
• request — the client request.
Figure 2 shows a simple rights function that matches the URI
of the client’s request with any path restrictions encoded in
the common name field of the certificate.
IX. RELATED WORK
Dennis and Van Horn [4] first used the term “capability” for
an unforgeable access token. Many capability-based systems
have been built, but they usually rely on a trusted runtime
environment in order to prevent forging of capabilities and to
mediate communication of capabilities. Chaum [2] presents the
first cryptographic approach to capabilities that does not make
such an assumption. The Livermore Network Communication
System [5] and the Amoeba distributed operating system [10]
adopted and improved on this approach [12]. Amoeba also
contained a directory service for capabilities. However, such
capabilities cannot be confined in any way and rights that can
be delegated are predefined. Codecaps build on this work, but
supports fine-grained rights delegation through embedded code
and supports confinement by embedding a private key in each
codecap.
The capability mechanism proposed by Harnik et al. [8]
uses keyed cryptographic hashes in a way similar to Amoeba
and supports delegation by chaining hashes. Each entry on the
2http://twistedmatrix.com
3https://developer.mozilla.org/en/SpiderMonkey
chain can contain regular expressions to express which rights
are being delegated. The mechanism is less expensive than our
approach, but does not support rights amplification and cannot
be used for secure abstraction. The MyProxy service [1] uses
X.509 proxy certificates to delegate credentials, but lacks fa-
cilities for including and evaluating complex rights functions.
Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure support
capability-like URLs for use in the cloud, which contain
a query, an expiration time, and a signature. The query is
similar to the embedded code of rights functions in codecaps.
However, the URLs cannot be confined or be delegated in a
restricted manner, and the mechanisms do not support rights
amplification.
X. CONCLUSION
We have proposed codecaps as a flexible way of providing
discretionary access control in the cloud. We are developing
this as part of a sports analytics application that runs on a
federated cloud environment. Codecaps are essentially certifi-
cate chains corresponding to the chain of delegation, but has
the novel property that they may contain boolean JavaScript
function that checks whether a requested operation is allowed.
Using codecaps, we have demonstrated how it is possible
to do fine-grained rights delegation, confinement, and rights
amplication as needed for secure abstraction layers. We have
also shown various solutions to revocation. Users can maintain
codecaps and facilitate their delegation using codecap direc-
tories.
We have not yet finished the implementation of our codecap-
based access control infrastructure, but soon hope to present
experiential data on its effectiveness.
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